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Abstract
We study the role of coded side information in single-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR). An
instance of the single-server PIR problem includes a server that stores a database of K independently and
uniformly distributed messages, and a user who wants to retrieve one of these messages from the server.
We consider settings in which the user initially has access to a coded side information which includes
a linear combination of a subset of M messages in the database. We assume that the identities of the
M messages that form the support set of the coded side information as well as the coding coefficients
are initially unknown to the server. We consider two different models, depending on whether the support
set of the coded side information includes the requested message or not. We also consider the following
two privacy requirements: (i) the identities of both the demand and the support set of the coded side
information need to be protected, or (ii) only the identity of the demand needs to be protected. For
each model and for each of the privacy requirements, we consider the problem of designing a protocol
for generating the user’s query and the server’s answer that enables the user to decode the message
they need while satisfying the privacy requirement. We characterize the (scalar-linear) capacity of each
setting, defined as the ratio of the number of information bits in a message to the minimum number
of information bits downloaded from the server over all (scalar-linear) protocols that satisfy the privacy
condition. Our converse proofs rely on new information-theoretic arguments—tailored to the setting of
single-server PIR and different from the commonly-used techniques in multi-server PIR settings. We also
present novel capacity-achieving scalar-linear protocols for each of the settings being considered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem, there is a user that wishes to privately download
a single or multiple messages belonging to a database stored on a single or multiple (non-colluding or
colluding) servers. There are two different types of PIR in the literature: computational and information-
theoretic. In the computational PIR (see, e.g., [1]), the identity of the requested message(s) must be
protected from the server(s), assuming that the server(s) is computationally bounded. Aside from the
computational PIR is the information-theoretic PIR, introduced by Chor et al. in [2], where no such
assumption is made on the computational power of the server(s), and the identity of the requested mes-
sage(s) need to be protected in an information-theoretic sense. The drawback of this strong requirement
is that in the single-server case, the user must download the entire database from the server [2]. This has
led to an extensive body of work on multi-server information-theoretic PIR (see, e.g., [3]–[16]).
Initiated by the work of Kadhe et al. in [17] and [18], the information-theoretic PIR was recently
extended to the settings wherein the user has a random subset of messages in the database as side
information, and the identities of side information messages are unknown to the server(s) [17]–[25].
(Some other types of side information, not closely related to our work, were also studied, see, e.g., [26]–
[29].) Three different notions of privacy were considered: (i) (W, S)-privacy, where both the identities of
the requested messages (denoted by the index set W) and the identities of the side information messages
(denoted by the index set S) must be protected [17]–[20], [23], [24]; (ii) joint W-privacy, where only the
identities of the requested messages (and not necessarily the identities of the side information messages)
must be protected [17]–[22]; and (iii) individual W-privacy, where the identity of each requested message
must be protected individually (but not necessarily jointly) [25]. In single-message PIR, where the user
wants to retrieve one message only, the notions of joint and individual W-privacy, referred to as W-privacy
for brevity, are equivalent. The differences between these two notions of W-privacy in multi-message
PIR were studied in [25].
In this work, we focus on single-message single-server information-theoretic PIR in the presence of
a coded side information. We initiated this study in [30] and [31] for the cases in which W-privacy
and (W, S)-privacy are required, respectively, where W denotes the index of the requested message,
and S denotes the index set of the messages in the support set of the coded side information. We have
recently extended these works to the multi-server setting in [32] and [33]. In this problem, there is a
single server storing a database of K independently and uniformly distributed messages; and there is a
user who is interested in retrieving a single message from the server. The user initially knows a linear
coded combination of a subset of M messages in the database, where the identities of the messages in the
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OUR MAIN RESULTS FOR SINGLE-SERVER PIR WITH CODED SIDE INFORMATION
Privacy Condition (W, S)-Privacy W-Privacy
Model
W 6∈ S
(PIR-PCSI–I)
W ∈ S
(PIR-PCSI–II)
W 6∈ S
(PIR-CSI–I)
W ∈ S
(PIR-CSI–II)
Parameters 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1 2 ≤ M ≤ K 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1 2 ≤ M ≤ K
Capacity
(K − M)−1
(Theorem 1)
(K − M + 1)−1 for M > K+12
(Theorem 2)
Open for M ≤ K+12
(Lower bound in Theorem 2)
⌈ KM+1 ⌉
−1
(Theorem 3)
1 for M = 2, M = K
1
2 for 3 ≤ M ≤ K − 1
(Theorem 4)
Scalar-Linear
Capacity
(K − M + 1)−1
(Theorem 2)
Achievability
Scheme
Specialized
GRS Code
Modified Specialized
GRS Code
Modified
Partition-and-Code
Randomized
Selection-and-Code
support set of the user’s coded side information as well as their coding coefficients are initially unknown
to the server. This setting can be motivated by several practical scenarios. For instance, the user may
have obtained a coded side information via overhearing in a wireless network; or on-the-fly recording of
a random linear combination of messages being broadcast by an information source; or from a trusted
agent, e.g., an entity who makes profit by offering privacy to users, with limited knowledge about the
database; or from the information which is locally stored, e.g., using an erasure code, in the user’s cache
of limited size. Recently, inspired by [17], a group of researchers from Google in [34] used the idea of a
coded side information in a new single-server PIR scheme, which leverages both the information-theoretic
and computational PIR.
The problem is to design a protocol for generating the user’s query and the server’s answer which
satisfy one of the following two privacy conditions: (W, S)-privacy, i.e., the privacy of both the requested
message and the messages in the support set of the coded side information must be preserved, or W-
privacy, i.e., only the privacy of the requested message needs to be protected. We refer to this problem
as PIR with Private Coded Side Information (PIR-PCSI) or PIR with Coded Side Information (PIR-CSI)
when (W, S)-privacy or W-privacy is required, respectively.
Depending on whether the support set of the user’s coded side information includes the user’s demand or
not, we consider two different models for each of the PIR-PCSI and PIR-CSI problems. In the first model,
referred to as Model I, the demand does not belong to the support set of the coded side information,
whereas in the second model, referred to as Model II, the demand belongs to the support set of the
coded side information. We refer to the PIR-PCSI (or PIR-CSI) problem under Model I and Model II as
PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-CSI–I) and PIR-PCSI–II (or PIR-CSI–II), respectively.
For each of these settings, we define the capacity as the ratio of the number of information bits in
a message to the minimum number of information bits downloaded from the server over all protocols
that satisfy the privacy condition. We similarly define the scalar-linear capacity of each setting, except
when the minimum is taken over all scalar-linear protocols—the protocols in which the server’s answer
contains only scalar-linear combinations of the messages in the database (i.e., linear combinations with
scalar coding coefficients), that satisfy the privacy condition. In this work, our goal is to characterize
the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity of each of the PIR-PCSI and PIR-CSI settings, and design a
capacity-achieving protocol for each of these settings.
The main contributions of this work are as follows. The results are also summarized in Table I.
For the PIR-PCSI–I setting, we prove that the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity are both given
by (K − M)−1 for any 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1. This is interesting because, as shown in [17, Theorem 2], the
capacity of PIR with M randomly chosen messages as side information is equal to (K − M)−1 when
(W, S)-privacy is required. This shows that for achieving (W, S)-privacy, even one random linear coded
combination of a random subset of M messages is as efficient as M randomly chosen messages separately,
as side information.
For the PIR-PCSI–II setting, we prove that the scalar-linear capacity for any value of 2 ≤ M ≤ K
and the capacity for any value of K+12 < M ≤ K are given by (K − M + 1)
−1, whereas the capacity
for any value of 2 ≤ M ≤ K+12 remains open. This shows that when the user knows only one random
linear coded combination whose support set consists of the requested message along with M − 1 other
randomly chosen messages, achieving (W, S)-privacy is no more costly than that when the user knows
M − 1 randomly chosen (uncoded) messages, different from the requested message.
For the PIR-CSI–I setting, we prove that the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity are given by
⌈ KM+1⌉
−1 for any 0 ≤ M < K. Interestingly, this is the same as the capacity of PIR with M randomly
chosen messages as side information [17, Theorem 1]. For the PIR-CSI–II setting, we prove that the
capacity and the scalar-linear capacity are equal to 1 for M = 2 and M = K, and are equal to 12 for
any 3 ≤ M ≤ K − 1. This result is particularly interesting because, unlike the previous settings, the gap
between the capacity and the trivial capacity upper bound 1 is a constant, regardless of the size of support
set of the side information (M).
The converse proofs are based on new information-theoretic arguments. These arguments are tailored
to the setting of single-server PIR and are different from the proof techniques being commonly used in
the multi-server PIR settings. In particular, the main ingredients in the proofs are a necessary condition
for (W, S)-privacy and a necessary condition for W-privacy, which reveal the combinatorial nature of
the problem of single-server PIR in the presence of (uncoded or coded) side information. In addition,
our converse proofs for the PIR-PCSI–I and PIR-CSI–I settings serve as alternative information-theoretic
proofs for the results in [17] which were proven using index coding arguments.
The achievability proofs are based on novel scalar-linear PIR-PCSI and PIR-CSI protocols. In particular,
the proposed PIR-PCSI–I and PIR-PCSI–II protocols, termed the Specialized GRS Code protocol and
the Modified Specialized GRS Code protocol, rely on the Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes that
contain a specific codeword, depending on the index of the requested message as well as the indices of
the messages in the support set of the coded side information and their coding coefficients.
The proposed protocol for the PIR-CSI–I setting, termed the Modified Partition-and-Code (MPC)
protocol, is inspired by our recently proposed Partition-and-Code with Interference Alignment protocol
in [35] for single-server private computation with uncoded side information. The MPC protocol also
generalizes the Partition-and-Code protocol of [17] for single-server PIR with uncoded side information.
It is noteworthy that we originally introduced a different PIR-CSI–I protocol in [30], termed Randomized
Partitioning (RP) protocol, which is also capacity-achieving.
For the PIR-CSI–II setting, we propose a protocol, termed the Randomized Selection-and-Code proto-
col, which is based on the idea of randomizing the structure of the user’s query and the server’s answer
(instead of always using a fixed structure for query/answer). We introduced this idea in [30] for the first
time, and Tian et al., concurrently and independently, used a similar idea in [36] for multi-server PIR
without side information.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND FORMULATION
A. Basic Notation
Throughout this paper, we denote random variables and their realizations by bold-face and regular
letters, respectively. The functions P(·), P(·|·), H(·), H(·|·), and I(·; ·|·) denote probability, conditional
probability, (Shannon) entropy, conditional entropy, and conditional mutual information, respectively.
Let Fq be a finite field for a prime power q, and let F
×
q , Fq \ {0} be the multiplicative group of Fq.
Let Fql be an extension field of Fq for an integer l ≥ 1, and let L , l log2 q. The parameters q and l
are referred to as the base-field size and the field-extension degree, respectively.
Let K ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ M ≤ K be two integers. Let K , {1, . . . , K}. We denote by S the set of all
M-subsets (i.e., all subsets of size M) of K, and denote by C the set of all ordered multisets of size M
(i.e., all length-M sequences) with elements from F×q . Note that |S| = (
K
M) and |C| = (q− 1)
M.
B. Setup and Assumptions
There is a server that stores a set of K messages X1, . . . , XK, denoted by XK , {X1, . . . , XK}, where
Xi’s are independently and uniformly distributed over Fql , i.e., H(Xi) = L for i ∈ K and H(XK) = KL,
where XK , {X1, . . . , XK}. There is a user who wants to retrieve a message XW for some W ∈ K from
the server, and knows a linear combination Y[S,C] , ∑i∈S ciXi on the messages XS , {Xi : i ∈ S},
for some S , {i1, . . . , iM} ∈ S and C , {ci1 , . . . , ciM} ∈ C. We refer to XW as the demand, W as the
demand index, XS as the side information support set, S as the side information support index set, M
as the side information support size, and Y[S,C] as the (coded) side information.
We assume that S and C are uniformly distributed over S and C, respectively. Also, we consider two
different models for the conditional distribution of W given S = S:
Model I: W is uniformly distributed over K \ S,
P(W = W|S = S) =


1
K−M , W ∈ K \ S,
0, otherwise;
Model II: W is uniformly distributed over S,
P(W = W|S = S) =


1
M , W ∈ S,
0, otherwise.
For both Models I and II, W is distributed uniformly over K.
Let 1{W∈S} be an indicator random variable such that that 1{W∈S} = 0 if W 6∈ S, and 1{W∈S} = 1
otherwise. Note that 1{W∈S} = 0 in Model I, and 1{W∈S} = 1 in Model II.
We assume that the server knows the underlying model (i.e., whether W 6∈ S or W ∈ S), the side
information support size M, the distributions of S and C, and the conditional distribution of W given S,
in advance; whereas the realizations W, S, C are unknown to the server in advance.
C. Privacy and Recoverability Conditions
For any given W, S, C, in order to retrieve XW , the user sends to the server a query Q
[W,S,C], which is
a (potentially stochastic) function of W, S, C.1 For simplifying the notation, we denote Q[W,S,C] by Q.
The query must satisfy one of the following two privacy conditions:
(i) both the user’s demand index and side information support index set must be protected from the
server;
1In general, the query may also depend on the content of the side information—notwithstanding, in this work we focus on
queries that are “universal” in the sense that any such query achieves privacy for all realizations of the messages.
(ii) only the user’s demand index (and not necessarily the side information support index set) must be
protected from the server.
The condition (i) is referred to as the (W, S)-privacy condition, and the condition (ii) is referred to
as the W-privacy condition. (Note that (W, S)-privacy is a stronger condition than W-privacy.) The
(W, S)-privacy condition implies that (W, S) and Q must be conditionally independent given 1{W∈S},
I(W, S; Q|1{W∈S}) = 0.
The W-privacy condition implies that W and Q must be conditionally independent given 1{W∈S},
I(W; Q|1{W∈S}) = 0.
Equivalently, for a given θ ∈ {0, 1}, when (W, S)-privacy is required, it must hold that
P(W = W∗, S = S∗|Q = Q[W,S,C],1{W∈S} = θ)
= P(W = W∗, S = S∗|1{W∈S} = θ)
for all W∗ ∈ K and S∗ ∈ S , and when W-privacy is required, it must hold that
P(W = W∗|Q = Q[W,S,C],1{W∈S} = θ)
= P(W = W∗|1{W∈S} = θ)
for all W∗ ∈ K.2
Upon receiving Q[W,S,C], the server sends to the user an answer A[W,S,C], which is a (deterministic)
function of the query Q[W,S,C], the indicator variable 1{W∈S}, and the messages in XK. For simplifying
the notation, we denote A[W,S,C] by A. Note that (W, S, C) ↔ (Q,1{W∈S}, XK) ↔ A forms a Markov
chain, and H(A|Q,1{W∈S}, XK , W, S, C) = 0.
The answer A[W,S,C] along with Q[W,S,C],1{W∈S}, Y
[S,C], and W, S, C must enable the user to retrieve
the demand XW . That is, it must hold that
H(XW|A, Q,1{W∈S}, Y
[S,C], W, S, C) = 0.
We refer to this condition as the recoverability condition.
2The mutual information based definitions of the (W, S)-privacy and W-privacy conditions will be used in the converse proofs,
whereas their probability based counterparts will be used in the achievability proofs.
D. PIR-PCSI and PIR-CSI Problems
For each type of privacy and for each model, the problem is to design a protocol for generating a
query Q[W,S,C] (and the corresponding answer A[W,S,C], given Q[W,S,C], 1{W∈S}, and XK) for any given
W, S, C, such that both the privacy and recoverability conditions are satisfied. Note that the protocol is
assumed to be known at the server. When (W, S)-privacy is required, we refer to this problem as Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) with Private Coded Side Information (PIR-PCSI), and when W-privacy is
required we refer to this problem as PIR with Coded Side Information (PIR-CSI).
The PIR-PCSI problem under Model I (or Model II) is referred to as the PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II)
setting; and the PIR-CSI problem under Model I (or Model II) is referred to as the PIR-CSI–I (or PIR-
CSI–II) setting. A protocol for generating query/answer for the PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) setting is
referred to as a PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) protocol. A PIR-CSI–I (or PIR-CSI–II) protocol is defined
similarly.
E. Capacity and Scalar-Linear Capacity
The rate of a PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) protocol is defined as the ratio of the entropy of a message,
i.e., L, to the conditional entropy of A[W,S,C] given that 1{W∈S} = 0 (or 1{W∈S} = 1). The rate of a
PIR-CSI–I (or PIR-CSI–II) protocol is defined similarly.
The capacity of PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) setting is defined as the supremum of rates over all
PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) protocols and over all base-field sizes q and all field-extension degrees l;
and the capacity of PIR-CSI–I (or PIR-CSI–II) setting is defined similarly. The scalar-linear capacity
of PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) setting is defined as the supremum of rates over all scalar-linear PIR-
PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) protocols (i.e., the protocols in which the answer of the server consists only of
the scalar-linear combinations of the messages in XK) and over all q and l. The scalar-linear capacity
of PIR-CSI–I (or PIR-CSI–II) setting is defined similarly.3
F. Problem Statement
In this work, our goal is to derive upper bounds on the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity of the
PIR-PCSI–I, PIR-PCSI–II, PIR-CSI–I, and PIR-CSI–II settings, and to design protocols that achieve the
corresponding upper-bounds.
3Although our definitions of capacity and scalar-linear capacity are independent of the base-field size q and the field-extension
degree l, these quantities may depend on q and l in general. In this work, we show that the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity
of the PIR-PCSI settings are achievable so long as q ≥ K and l ≥ 1; and depending on the parameters K, M and the model (I
or II), the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-CSI settings are achievable so long as q ≥ 2 or q ≥ 3 and l ≥ 1.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We present our main results in this section. The results for the PIR-PCSI–I and PIR-PCSI–II settings are
summarized in Section III-A, and the results for the PIR-CSI–I and PIR-CSI–II settings are summarized
in Section III-B
The following two lemmas give a necessary condition for (W, S)-privacy and W-privacy, respectively.
These simple but powerful lemmas are the key components in the converse proofs of our main results.
Lemma 1. For (W, S)-privacy, for a given θ ∈ {0, 1}, for any W∗ ∈ K and S∗ ∈ S with 1{W∗∈S∗} = θ,
there must exist C∗ ∈ C such that
H(XW∗ |A, Q,1{W∈S} = θ, Y
[S∗ ,C∗]) = 0.
Proof. The proof is by the way of contradiction. For a given θ ∈ {0, 1}, consider an arbitrary W∗ ∈ K
and an arbitrary S∗ ∈ S such that 1{W∗∈S∗} = θ. Suppose that there does not exist any C
∗ ∈ C such that
H(XW∗ |A, Q,1{W∈S} = θ, Y
[S∗ ,C∗]) = 0. If W∗ and S∗ are respectively the user’s demand index and
side information support index set, no matter what the user’s side information Y[S
∗ ,·] is, the user cannot
recover XW∗ given the answer, query, and the side information Y
[S∗ ,·]. This violates the recoverability
condition. Thus, W∗ and S∗ cannot be the user’s demand index and side information support index
set, respectively. This obviously violates the (W, S)-privacy condition, because given the query, every
W∗ ∈ K and every S∗ ∈ S such that 1{W∗∈S∗} = θ must be equally likely to be the user’s demand
index and side information support index set, respectively. ✷
Lemma 2. For W-privacy, for a given θ ∈ {0, 1}, for any W∗ ∈ K, there must exist S∗ ∈ S with
1{W∗∈S∗} = θ and C
∗ ∈ C such that
H(XW∗ |A, Q,1{W∈S} = θ, Y
[S∗ ,C∗]) = 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1—except that the W-privacy condition is used
instead of the (W, S)-privacy condition. The proof is omitted for brevity. ✷
A. PIR-PCSI
In this section, we present our main results for the PIR-PCSI–I and PIR-PCSI–II settings. The capacity
and the scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-PCSI–I setting (for all 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1) are characterized in
Theorem 1, and the capacity (for all K+12 < M ≤ K) and the scalar-linear capacity (for all 2 ≤ M ≤ K)
of the PIR-PCSI–II setting are characterized in Theorem 2. For any 2 ≤ M ≤ K+12 , the capacity of the
PIR-PCSI–II setting, which we conjecture to be the same as the scalar-linear capacity, remains open. The
proofs are given in Sections IV and V.
Theorem 1. For the PIR-PCSI–I setting with K messages and side information support size M, the
capacity and the scalar-linear capacity are given by (K − M)−1 for all 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1.
The converse follows directly from the result of [17, Theorem 2], which was proven using an index
coding argument, for single-server single-message PIR with (uncoded) side information when (W, S)-
privacy is required. In this work, we provide an alternative proof of converse by upper bounding the
rate of any PIR-PCSI–I protocol using the information-theoretic arguments (see Section IV-A). The key
component of the proof is the necessary condition for (W, S)-privacy, stated in Lemma 1.
The achievability proof relies on a new scalar-linear PIR-PCSI–I protocol, termed the Specialized GRS
Code protocol, which achieves the rate (K − M)−1 (see Section IV-B). This protocol is based on the
Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes that contain a specific codeword depending on W, S, C.
Remark 1. As shown in [17], when there is a single server storing K independent and identically
distributed messages, and there is a user that knows M randomly chosen (uncoded) messages as their
side information and demands a single message not in their side information, in order to guarantee (W, S)-
privacy, the minimum download cost is (K− M)L, where L is the entropy of a message. Surprisingly, this
result matches the result of Theorem 1. This shows that, when compared to having M random messages
separately as side information, for achieving (W, S)-privacy there will be no additional loss in capacity
even if only one random linear coded combination of M random messages is known by the user.
Theorem 2. For the PIR-PCSI–II setting with K messages and side information support size M, the
capacity is given by (K − M + 1)−1 for all K+12 < M ≤ K, and it is lower bounded by (K − M + 1)
−1
for all 2 ≤ M ≤ K+12 . Moreover, the scalar-linear capacity is given by (K − M + 1)
−1 for all
2 ≤ M ≤ K.
The converse proof for the scalar-linear case is based on a mix of algebraic and information-theoretic
arguments (see Section V-A), and the proof of converse for the general case relies on different information-
theoretic arguments. The main ingredient of the proofs is the result of Lemma 1.
The proof of achievability is based on a novel scalar-linear protocol, referred to as the Modified
Specialized GRS Code protocol—a modified version of the Specialized GRS Code protocol, which
achieves the rate (K − M + 1)−1 (see Section V-B).
Remark 2. Interestingly, comparing the results of [17, Theorem 2] and Theorem 2, one can see that
when the side information is composed of M− 1 randomly chosen messages (different from the requested
message), (W, S)-privacy cannot be achieved more efficiently than the case in which the side information
is only one random linear coded combination of M randomly chosen messages including the demand.
B. PIR-CSI
In this section, we present our main results for the PIR-CSI–I and PIR-CSI–II settings. The capacity
and the scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-CSI–I setting (for all 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1) and the capacity and
the scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-CSI–II setting (for all 2 ≤ M ≤ K) are characterized in Theorems 3
and 4, respectively. The proofs are given in Sections VI and VII.
Theorem 3. For the PIR-CSI–I setting with K messages and side information support size M, the capacity
and the scalar-linear capacity are given by ⌈ KM+1⌉
−1
for all 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1.
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, using information-theoretic arguments, we give an
upper bound on the rate of any PIR-CSI–I protocol (see Section VI-A). The proofs rely primarily on the
necessary condition for W-privacy, stated in Lemma 2. In the second part, we construct a new scalar-linear
PIR-CSI–I protocol, termed the Modified Partition-and-Code (MPC) protocol, which achieves this rate
upper-bound (see Section VI-B). The proposed protocol is inspired by our recently proposed Partition-
and-Code with Interference Alignment protocol in [35] for single-server private computation with uncoded
side information.
Remark 3. Interestingly, the capacity of PIR with (uncoded) side information [17] is also equal to
⌈ KM+1⌉
−1 where M is the number of (uncoded) messages known to the user in advance as side informa-
tion. This shows that there will be no loss in capacity, when compared to the case that the user knows M
randomly chosen messages separately, even if the user knows only one random linear coded combination
of M randomly chosen messages.
Remark 4. When (W, S)-privacy is required, the result of Theorem 1 shows that the capacity of single-
server PIR with a coded side information with support size M that does not include the demand is equal
to (K− M)−1. Note that ⌈ KM+1⌉ < K− M for all 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 2. This implies that the capacity of the
PIR-CSI–I setting is strictly greater than that of the PIR-PCSI–I setting for any 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 2. This is
expected because W-privacy is a weaker notion of privacy when compared to (W, S)-privacy. However,
for the extremal case of M = K − 1, as can be seen (W, S)-privacy comes at no extra cost compared to
W-privacy.
Theorem 4. For the PIR-CSI–II setting with K messages and side information support size M, the
capacity and the scalar-linear capacity are equal to 1 for M = 2, K, and 1/2 for all 3 ≤ M ≤ K − 1.
For each range of values of M, the proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we use information-
theoretic arguments—based on the result of Lemma 2, so as to upper bound the rate of any PIR-CSI–II
protocol (see Section VII-A). In the second part, we construct novel scalar-linear PIR-CSI–II protocols,
collectively termed the Randomized Selection-and-Code (RSC) protocols, for different ranges of values
of M. The proposed protocols rely on probabilistic techniques, and achieve the corresponding rate upper-
bounds (see Section VII-B).
Remark 5. Interestingly, Theorem 4 shows that when W-privacy is required, no matter what the size
of support set of the side information is, the user can privately retrieve any message belonging to the
support set of their coded side information, with a download cost at most twice the cost of downloading
the message directly—which obviously does not preserve the privacy of the requested message.
Remark 6. As shown in Theorem 2, when (W, S)-privacy is required, the (scalar-linear) capacity of
single-server PIR with a coded side information whose support set includes the requested message is
equal to (K − M + 1)−1, where M is the side information support size. The result of Theorem 4
matches this result for the cases of M = K and M = K − 1, and hence, (W, S)-privacy and W-privacy
are attainable at the same cost in these cases; whereas for the other cases of M, achieving (W, S)-privacy
is much more costly than achieving W-privacy.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Converse
As shown in [17] using an index-coding argument, when (W, S)-privacy is required, the capacity of
PIR with M uncoded messages as side information is given by (K − M)−1. Obviously, the capacity of
the PIR-PCSI–I setting is upper bounded by this quantity. This proves the converse for Theorem 1. In
this section, we present an alternative information-theoretic proof for the general case, which also proves
the converse for the scalar-linear case.
Lemma 3. For any 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1, the (scalar-linear) capacity of the PIR-PCSI–I setting is upper
bounded by (K − M)−1.
Proof. In the following, all entropies are conditional on the event 1{W∈S} = 0, and we remove this
event from the conditions everywhere, for the ease of notation. We need to show that H(A) ≥ (K − M)L.
Take arbitrary W, S, C (and Y , Y[S,C]) such that W 6∈ S. Then, we have
H(A) ≥ H(A|Q, Y) (1)
= H(A|Q, Y) + H(XW |A, Q, Y) (2)
= H(A, XW |Q, Y) (3)
= H(XW |Q, Y) + H(A|Q, Y, XW) (4)
= H(XW) + H(A|Q, Y, XW) (5)
where (1) follows since conditioning does not increase the entropy; (2) holds because H(XW |A, Q, Y) =
0 (by the recoverability condition); (3) and (4) follow from the chain rule of entropy; and (5) follows
from H(XW |Q, Y) = H(XW) since XW is independent of (Q, Y) (noting that W 6∈ S).
If W ∪ S = K (i.e., M = K − 1), then H(A) ≥ H(XW) = L (by using the first term in (5)), as was
to be shown. If W ∪ S 6= K, we proceed by lower bounding the second term in (5), H(A|Q, Y, XW). By
Lemma 1, for each i ∈ K \ (W ∪ S), there exists Ci ∈ C (and Yi , Y
[S,Ci]) such that H(Xi|A, Q, Yi) =
0. Let I be a maximal subset of K \ (W ∪ S) such that Y and YI , {Yi}i∈I are linearly independent.
(Note that |I| ≤ |S| − 1 = M− 1.) Let XI , {Xi}i∈I . Then, we have
H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥ H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI)
≥ H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI)
+ H(XI |A, Q, Y, XW , YI) (6)
= H(A, XI |Q, Y, XW , YI)
= H(XI |Q, Y, XW , YI)
+ H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI , XI)
= H(XI)
+ H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI , XI) (7)
where (6) holds because H(Xi|A, Q, Yi) = 0 for all i ∈ I (by assumption); and (7) holds since XI is
independent of (Q, Y, XW , YI) by construction (noting that I and W ∪ S are disjoint). The first term
in (7), H(XI), is lower bounded by |I|L ≥ 0. Thus, in order to further lower bound H(A|Q, Y, XW),
we need to lower bound the second term in (7), H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI , XI). By the maximality of I, for
each j ∈ J , K \ (W ∪ S ∪ I), there exists C j ∈ C (and Y j , Y
[S,C j], which is linearly dependent on
Y and YI) such that H(X j|A, Q, Y j) = 0, and as a consequence, H(X j|A, Q, Y, YI) = 0. (Note that
|J| = K − M − 1− |I|.) Let XJ , {X j} j∈J . Then, we can write
H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI , XI)
= H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI , XI)
+ H(XJ|A, Q, Y, XW , YI , XI) (8)
= H(A, XJ |Q, Y, XW , YI , XI)
= H(XJ |Q, Y, XW , YI , XI)
+ H(A|Q, Y, XW , YI , XI , XJ)
≥ H(XJ) (9)
where (8) holds since H(X j|A, Q, Y, YI) = 0 for all j ∈ J (by assumption); and (9) holds because
XJ and (Q, Y, XW , YI , XI) are independent by construction (noting that J and W ∪ S ∪ I are disjoint).
Putting (5), (7), and (9) together, H(A) ≥ H(XW) + H(XI) + H(XJ) = L + |I|L + (K − M − 1 −
|I|)L = (K − M)L, as was to be shown. ✷
B. Achievability
In this section, we propose a scalar-linear PIR-PCSI–I protocol that achieves the rate (K − M)−1. The
proposed protocol requires a base-field size q ≥ K (and arbitrary field-extension degree l ≥ 1) where
the messages Xi’s are elements from Fql .
It is noteworthy that the rate (K−M)−1 is not necessarily achievable for q < K, and for the special case
of scalar-linear schemes, the achievability of this rate is conditional upon the existence of a (K, K − M)
maximum distance seperable (MDS) code over Fq that has a codeword with support W ∪ S such that the
jth code symbol is non-zero for j = W and it is equal to c j for each j ∈ S where c j is the coefficient
of the message X j in the coded side information Y
[S,C].
Specialized GRS Code Protocol: This protocol consists of three steps as follows:
Step 1: First, the user arbitrarily chooses K distinct elements ω1, . . . ,ωK from Fq, and constructs a
polynomial
p(x) , ∏
i∈K\(W∪S)
(x −ωi).
Then, the user constructs K − M (ordered) sets Q1, . . . , QK−M, each of size K, defined as
Qi = {v1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , vKω
i−1
K },
where the parameters v j’s are chosen as follows. For each j ∈ S, v j =
c j
p(ω j)
where c j is the coefficient
of X j in Y
[S,C]; and for each j 6∈ S, v j is chosen at random from F
×
q .
The user then sends to the server the query Q[W,S,C] = {Q1, . . . , QK−M}.
Note that the jth element in the set Qi can be thought of as the entry (i, j) of a (K − M)× K matrix
G , [gT1 , . . . , g
T
K−M]
T
, which generates a (K, K − M) GRS code with distinct parameters ω1, . . . ,ωK
and non-zero multipliers v1, . . . , vK [37]. This construction ensures that such a GRS code has a specific
codeword, namely ∑
K−M
i=1 pigi where pi is the coefficient of x
i−1 in the expansion of the polynomial
p(x) = ∑K−Mi=1 pix
i−1, with support W ∪ S such that the jth code symbol is non-zero for j = W, and
it is equal to c j for each j ∈ S. This observation is the chief idea in the proof of the recoverability
condition for the proposed protocol.
Step 2: By using Qi’s, the server computes Ai’s, defined as Ai = ∑
K
j=1 v jω
i−1
j X j, and it sends the
answer A[W,S,C] = {A1, . . . , AK−M} to the user.
Note that Ai’s are the parity check equations of a (K, M) GRS code which is the dual code of the
GRS code generated by the matrix G defined earlier.
Step 3: Upon receiving the answer, the user retrieves XW by subtracting off the contribution of the
side information Y[S,C] from ∑K−Mi=1 pi Ai = cWXW + ∑i∈S ciXi.
Example 1. Consider a scenario where the server has K = 4 messages X1, . . . , X4 ∈ F5, and the user
demands the message X1 and has a coded side information Y = X2 + X3 with support size M = 2. For
this example, W = 1, S = {2, 3}, and C = {c2, c3} = {1, 1}.
First, the user chooses K = 4 distinct elementsω1, . . . ,ω4 from F5, say (ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4) = (0, 1, 2, 3).
Then, the user constructs the polynomial
p(x) = ∏
i 6∈W∪S
(x−ωi) = x−ω4 = x + 2.
Note that p(x) = p1 + p2x = 2 + x. The user then computes v j for j ∈ S, i.e., v2 and v3, by setting
v2 =
c2
p(ω2)
= 2 and v3 =
c3
p(ω3)
= 4, and chooses v j for j 6∈ S, i.e., v1 and v4, at random (from F
×
5 ).
Suppose that the user chooses v1 = 1 and v4 = 2. Then, the user constructs K − M = 2 (ordered) sets
Q1 = {v1, . . . , v4} = {1, 2, 4, 2} and Q2 = {v1ω1, . . . , v4ω4} = {0, 2, 3, 1}. The user then sends the
query Q = {Q1, Q2} to the server.
The server computes A1 = ∑
4
j=1 v jX j = X1 + 2X2 + 4X3 + 2X4 and A2 = ∑
4
j=1 v jω jX j = 2X2 +
3X3 + X4, and sends the answer A = {A1, A2} back to the user. Then, the user computes ∑
2
i=1 pi Ai =
2A1 + A2 = 2X1 + X2 + X3, and recovers X1 by subtracting off Y = X2 + X3.
For this example, the rate of the proposed protocol is 1/2.
Note that the server knows the protocol, including the parameters ω1, . . . ,ω4, and can compute the
multipliers v1, . . . , v4, given the query. Since the side information coefficients c2 and c3 are uniformly
distributed, the server finds each of the polynomials x −ω1 = x, x −ω2 = 4 + x, x −ω3 = 3 + x,
and x −ω4 = 2 + x equally likely to be the polynomial p(x) = p1 + p2x, constructed in Step 1
of the protocol. Since the server knows that by the protocol the user requires the linear combination
p1 A1 + p2 A2 to recover the demand, from the server’s perspective, each of the linear combinations
Z1 = A2, Z2 = 4A1 + A2, Z3 = 3A1 + A2, Z4 = 2A1 + A2, i.e., Z1 = 2X2 + 3X3 + X4, Z2 =
4X1 + 4X3 + 4X4, Z3 = 3X1 + 3X2 + 2X4, Z4 = 2X1 + X2 + X3, are equally likely to be the linear
combination required by the user. Note, also, that, for each candidate demand index (e.g., {1}) and
each candidate side information support index set (e.g., {2, 3}), there exists exactly one of the linear
combinations Z1, . . . , Z4 (e.g., Z4) from which the candidate demand (e.g., X1) can be recovered, given
some linear combination (e.g., X2 + X3) of the messages in the candidate side information support set
(e.g., X2, X3). By these arguments, the server finds every index i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} and every pair of indices
{i1, i2} such that i 6∈ {i1, i2} equally likely to be the user’s demand index and side information support
index set, respectively. This confirms that the proposed protocol achieves (W, S)-privacy in this example.
Lemma 4. The Specialized GRS Code protocol is a scalar-linear PIR-PCSI–I protocol, and achieves the
rate (K − M)−1.
Proof. See Appendix I-A. ✷
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
A. Converse
First, we prove the converse for the scalar-linear case of Theorem 2 for all 2 ≤ M ≤ K. The proof is
based on a combination of algebraic and information-theoretic arguments.
Lemma 5. For any 2 ≤ M ≤ K, the scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-PCSI–II setting is upper bounded
by (K − M + 1)−1.
Proof. In the following, all the entropies are conditional on the event 1{W∈S} = 1, and for simplifying
the notation, we remove this event from the conditions. We need to show that H(A) ≥ (K − M + 1)L.
Let I be the set of all i ∈ K such that H(Xi|A, Q) = 0. (Note that 0 ≤ |I| ≤ K). Let XI , {Xi}i∈I .
By assumption, XI and Q are independent and H(XI |A, Q) = 0. Then, we can write
H(A) ≥ H(A|Q)
= H(A|Q) + H(XI |A, Q)
= H(A, XI |Q)
= H(XI |Q) + H(A|Q, XI)
= H(XI) + H(A|Q, XI). (10)
If |I| ≥ K − M + 1, the first term in (10), H(XI), is lower bounded by (K − M + 1)L, and hence,
H(A) ≥ (K − M + 1)L, as was to be shown. If 0 ≤ |I| ≤ K− M, the second term in (10), H(A|Q, XI),
can be further lower bounded as follows.
Assume, w.l.o.g., that I = {1, . . . , |I|}. (Note that I = ∅ for |I| = 0.) Let J , {1, . . . , K − M− |I|+
1}, and let S j , {|I|+ 1, |I|+ j + 1, . . . , |I|+ j + M − 1} for j ∈ J. By Lemma 1, for each j ∈ J,
there exists C j ∈ C (and Y j , Y
[S j,C j]) such that H(X|I|+1|A, Q, Y j) = 0. Let Z j , Y j − c jX|I|+1 where
c j is the coefficient of X|I|+1 in Y j. For any scalar-linear protocol where the answer consists only of
scalar-linear combinations of messages in XK, it is easy to see that for each j ∈ J, (i) H(Z j|A, Q) = 0,
or (ii) H(Z j + cX|I|+1|A, Q) = 0 for some c ∈ F
×
q \ {c j}. (Otherwise, the server learns that W and S
cannot be |I|+ 1 and S j, respectively. This obviously violates the (W, S)-privacy condition.) In either
case (i) or (ii), one can see that H(Z j|A, Q, X|I|+1) = 0. (Note that this observation, which is the key
in the proof of Lemma 5, holds for all scalar-linear schemes, but not necessarily for all vector-linear
or non-linear schemes in general. This implies the need for a different proof technique for the general
schemes, and an example of such a technique is used in the proof of Lemma 6.) Let ZJ , {Z j} j∈J .
Then, we have
H(A|Q, XI) ≥ H(A|Q, XI , X|I|+1)
= H(A|Q, XI , X|I|+1)
+ H(ZJ |A, Q, XI , X|I|+1) (11)
= H(A, ZJ |Q, XI , X|I|+1)
= H(ZJ |Q, XI , X|I|+1)
+ H(A|Q, XI , X|I|+1, ZJ)
≥ H(ZJ) (12)
where (11) holds since H(Z j|A, Q, X|I|+1) = 0 for all j ∈ J (by assumption); and (12) follows because
ZJ is independent of (Q, XI , X|I|+1) by construction, noting that ZJ , XI , and X|I|+1 are linearly inde-
pendent. By the linear independence of Z j’s for all j ∈ J, it follows that H(ZJ) = (K − M − |I|+ 1)L.
By (10) and (12), we get H(A) ≥ H(XI) + H(ZJ) = |I|L + (K − M− |I|+ 1)L = (K − M + 1)L,
as was to be shown. ✷
Next, we give an information-theoretic proof of converse for the general case of Theorem 2 for all
K+1
2 < M ≤ K. For any 2 ≤ M ≤
K+1
2 , the converse proof remains open.
Lemma 6. For any K+12 < M ≤ K, the capacity of the PIR-PCSI–II setting is upper bounded by
(K − M + 1)−1.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5, for the ease of notation in the following we remove the event
1{W∈S} = 1 from the conditions of all the entropies. We need to show that H(A) ≥ (K − M + 1)L.
Let J , {1, . . . , K − M + 1} and S j , { j, . . . , j + M − 1} for j ∈ J. By Lemma 1, for each j ∈ J,
there exists C j ∈ C (and Y j , Y
[S j,C j]) such that H(X j|A, Q, Y j) = 0. Let XJ , {X j} j∈J . (Note that
|J| = K − M + 1 < M when M > K+12 ). Then, we can write
H(XJ , YJ |Q) = H(XJ , YJ) (13)
= 2(K − M + 1)L, (14)
where (13) holds since Q is independent of (XJ , YJ) (by assumption); and (14) follows because XJ
and YJ are independent by construction. (Note that XJ and YJ are not necessarily independent for
|J| = K − M + 1 ≥ M, and a different technique—which remains open, is required for the proof
of converse when 2 ≤ M ≤ K+12 .) Moreover, we have
H(XJ , YJ |A, Q) ≤ ∑
j∈J
H(X j, Y j|A, Q) (15)
= ∑
j∈J
H(Y j|A, Q)
+ ∑
j∈J
H(X j|A, Q, Y j)
= ∑
j∈J
H(Y j|A, Q) (16)
≤ ∑
j∈J
H(Y j)
= (K − M + 1)L, (17)
where (15) follows from the chain rule of entropy; (16) holds because H(X j|A, Q, Y j) = 0 for j ∈ J
(by assumption); and (17) holds because Y j’s for all j ∈ J are independent by construction, and Y j for
each j ∈ J is a scalar-linear combination of X j, X j+1, . . . , X j+M−1.
Using (14) and (17), we can bound H(XJ , YJ , A|Q) from below and above. On the one hand, we have
H(XJ , YJ , A|Q) ≥ H(XJ , YJ |Q)
= 2(K − M + 1)L, (18)
where (18) follows from (14). On the other hand, we have
H(XJ , YJ , A|Q) = H(A|Q)
+ H(XJ , YJ |A, Q)
≤ H(A|Q)
+ (K − M + 1)L, (19)
where (19) follows from (17). Now, combining (18) and (19), we have H(A|Q) ≥ (K − M + 1)L, and
as a consequence, H(A) ≥ H(A|Q) ≥ (K − M + 1)L, as was to be shown. ✷
B. Achievability
In this section, we propose a scalar-linear PIR-PCSI–II protocol, termed the Modified Specialized
GRS Code protocol, that achieves the rate (K − M + 1)−1. For this protocol, the requirements for the
parameters q and l are the same as those for the Specialized GRS Code protocol.
Modified Specialized GRS Code Protocol: This protocol consists of three steps, where the steps 2-3
are the same as Steps 2-3 in the Specialized GRS Code protocol (Section IV-B), when the parameter M
is replaced with M − 1 everywhere. The step 1 of the proposed protocol is as follows:
Step 1: For K arbitrarily chosen distinct elementsω1, . . . ,ωK from Fq, the user constructs a polynomial
p(x) =
K−M+1
∑
i=1
pix
i−1 , ∏
i∈K\S
(x−ωi),
and constructs K − M + 1 (ordered) sets Q1, . . . , QK−M+1, each of size K, defined as
Qi = {v1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , vKω
i−1
K },
where v j’s are chosen as follows. For each j ∈ S \W, v j =
c j
p(ω j)
where c j is the coefficient of X j in
Y[S,C]; vW =
c
p(ωW)
for a randomly chosen element c from F×q \ {cW} where cW is the coefficient of
XW in Y
[S,C]; and for each j 6∈ S, v j is chosen at random from F
×
q .
The user then sends to the server the query Q[W,S,C] = {Q1, . . . , QK−M+1}.
Example 2. Consider a scenario where the server has K = 4 messages X1, . . . , X4 ∈ F5, and the user
demands the message X1 and has a coded side information Y = X1 + X2 with support size M = 2. For
this example, W = 1, S = {1, 2}, and C = {c1, c2} = {1, 1}.
First, the user chooses K = 4 distinct elementsω1, . . . ,ω4 from F5, say (ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4) = (0, 1, 2, 3).
Then, the user constructs the polynomial
p(x) = ∏
i 6∈S
(x−ωi) = (x−ω3)(x −ω4) = (x + 3)(x + 2).
Note that p(x) = p1 + p2x + p3x
2 = 1 + x2. The user then computes v j for j ∈ S \ W, i.e., v2,
by setting v2 =
c2
p(ω2)
= 3; computes vW , i.e., v1, for a randomly chosen element c, say c = 4, from
F
×
5 \ {c1 = 1} by setting v1 =
c
p(ω1)
= 4; and chooses v j for j 6∈ S, i.e., v3 and v4, at random (from
F
×
5 ). Suppose that the user chooses v3 = 1 and v4 = 3. Then, the user constructs K − M + 1 = 3
(ordered) sets Q1 = {v1, . . . , v4} = {4, 3, 1, 3}, Q2 = {v1ω1, . . . , v4ω4} = {0, 3, 2, 4}, and Q3 =
{v1ω
2
1, . . . , v4ω
2
4} = {0, 3, 4, 2}. The user then sends the query Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3} to the server.
The server computes A1 = ∑
4
j=1 v jX j = 4X1 + 3X2 + X3 + 3X4, A2 = ∑
4
j=1 v jω jX j = 3X2 +
2X3 + 4X4, and A3 = ∑
4
j=1 v jω
2
j X j = 3X2 + 4X3 + 2X4, and sends the answer A = {A1, A2, A3}
back to the user. Then, the user computes ∑
3
i=1 pi Ai = A1 + A3 = 4X1 + X2, and recovers X1 by
subtracting off Y = X1 + X2.
For this example, the rate of the proposed protocol is 1/3.
The proof of (W, S)-privacy for the proposed protocol in this example is similar to the proof of
(W, S)-privacy for the Specialized GRS Code protocol in Example 1.
Lemma 7. The Modified Specialized GRS Code protocol is a scalar-linear PIR-PCSI–II protocol, and
achieves the rate (K − M + 1)−1.
Proof. See Appendix I-B. ✷
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
A. Converse
The capacity of the PIR-CSI–I setting is naturally upper bounded by the capacity of PIR with uncoded
side information [17] where M uncoded messages are available at the user as side information. As
shown in [17], the capacity of this problem is equal to ⌈ KM+1⌉
−1, and the proof of this result relies on an
index coding argument. In this section, we present an alternative converse proof for the case of general
PIR-CSI–I protocols, by using information-theoretic arguments. Obviously, this proof also serves for the
special case of scalar-linear PIR-CSI–I protocols.
Lemma 8. For any 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1, the (scalar-linear) capacity of the PIR-CSI–I setting is upper
bounded by ⌈ KM+1⌉
−1
.
Proof. In the following, all entropies are conditional on the event 1{W∈S} = 0, and this event is
removed from the conditions for the ease of notation. We need to show that H(A) ≥ ⌈ KM+1⌉L.
Take arbitrary W, S, C (and Y , Y[S,C]) such that W 6∈ S. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, it can be
shown that
H(A) ≥ H(XW) + H(A|Q, Y, XW). (20)
There are two cases: (i) W ∪ S = K, and (ii) W ∪ S 6= K. In the case (i), M = K − 1, and so,
⌈ KM+1⌉L = L. Since H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥ 0, then H(A) ≥ H(XW) = L (by (20)), as was to be shown.
In the case (ii), we proceed by lower bounding H(A|Q, Y, XW ) as follows.
We arbitrarily choose a message, say XW1 , for some W1 6∈ W ∪ S. By Lemma 2, there exist S1 ∈ S
with W1 6∈ S1 and C1 ∈ C (and Y1 = Y
[S1,C1]) such that H(XW1 |A, Q, Y1) = 0. Since conditioning
does not increase the entropy, then H(XW1 |A, Q, Y, XW , Y1) = 0. Thus,
H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥ H
(
A|Q, Y, XW , Y1
)
= H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1)
+ H(XW1 |A, Q, Y, XW , Y1)
= H
(
A, XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1
)
= H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1)
+ H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1, XW1)
= H(XW1)
+ H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1, XW1) (21)
where (21) holds because XW1 and (Q, Y, XW , Y1) are independent (noting that W1 6∈ W ∪ S ∪ S1), and
hence, H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1) = H(XW1).
Let n , ⌈ KM+1⌉. Similarly as above, it can be shown that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 there exist W1 , . . . , Wi ∈
K and S1, . . . , Si ∈ S with Wj 6∈ S j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i and Wi 6∈ ∪
i−1
j=1(Wj ∪ S j) ∪ (W ∪ S), and
C1, . . . , Ci ∈ C (and Y1 = Y
[S1,C1], . . . , Yi = Y
[Si,Ci]), such that
H(XWi |A, Q, Y, XW , Y1, XW1 , . . . , Yi−1, XWi−1 , Yi) = 0.
Note that by construction, ∣∣∣∪i−1j=1(Wj ∪ S j) ∪ (W ∪ S)
∣∣∣ ≤ (M + 1)i
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Repeating an argument similar to the one being used for lower bounding
H(A|Q, Y, XW) as in (21), it can be shown that
H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1, XW1 , . . . , Yi−1, XWi−1)
≥ H(XWi) + H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1, XW1 , . . . , Yi, XWi)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Combining these lower bounds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, we have
H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥
n−1
∑
i=1
H(XWi)
= (n − 1)L. (22)
Putting (20) and (22) together, we get H(A) ≥ nL = ⌈ KM+1⌉L. ✷
B. Achievability
In this section, we propose a scalar-linear PIR-CSI–I protocol for arbitrary 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1. This
protocol, termed Modified Partition-and-Code (MPC), is inspired by our recently proposed Partition-and-
Code with Interference Alignment protocol in [35] for private computation with uncoded side information.
The MPC protocol does not make any assumption on the base-field size q and the field-extension degree
l, and is applicable for arbitrary q ≥ 2 and l ≥ 1.
It should be noted that the Partition-and-Code protocol of [17] is only applicable to the PIR-CSI–I
setting when M + 1 divides K. Otherwise, when M + 1 is not a divisor of K, the Partition-and-Code
protocol will generate one part of size less than M + 1. This immediately results in a violation of the
W-privacy condition. This is because the user’s demand cannot be any of the messages pertaining to this
part, noting that (i) the support set of the user’s side information has size M, and (ii) all messages in
the user’s side information support set need to be combined with the user’s demand.
Modified Partition-and-Code (MPC) Protocol: This protocol consists of three steps as follows:
Step 1: Let n , ⌈ KM+1⌉. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, we define Ii , {(i − 1)(M + 1) + 1, . . . , i(M + 1)},
and In , {(n − 1)(M + 1) + 1, . . . , K, 1, . . . , n(M + 1)− K}. (Note that In = {(n − 1)(M + 1) +
1, . . . , K} when M + 1 divides K.) First, the user constructs a random permutation pi on K = {1, . . . , K}
as follows.
The user randomly chooses an index j∗ from K, and assigns the demand index W to pi( j∗), i.e.,
pi( j∗) = W. Let i∗ , ⌈ j
∗
M+1⌉ be the smallest index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that j
∗ ∈ Ii. Then, the user
randomly assigns the side information support indices in S to {pi( j) : j ∈ Ii∗ \ { j
∗}} and randomly
assigns the (not-yet-assigned) indices in K \ (W ∪ S) to {pi( j) : j ∈ K \ Ii∗}.
Next, the user constructs n (ordered) sets U1, . . . , Un, each of size M + 1, defined as Ui = {pi( j) :
j ∈ Ii}; and constructs an (ordered) multiset V, defined as V = {cpi( j) : j ∈ Ii∗} where cpi( j) for
j ∈ Ii∗ \ { j
∗} is the coefficient of message Xpi( j) in the side information Y
[S,C], and cpi( j∗) = cW is a
randomly chosen element from F×q .
The user then constructs Qi = (Ui, V) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and sends to the server the query Q
[W,S,C] =
{Q1, . . . , Qn}.
Step 2: By using Qi = (Ui, V)’s, the server computes Ai’s, defined as Ai = ∑
M+1
j=1 ci j Xi j where
Ui = {i1, . . . , iM+1} and V = {ci1 , . . . , ciM+1}, and sends back to the user the answer A
[W,S,C] =
{A1, . . . , An}.
Step 3: Upon receiving the answer from the server, the user retrieves XW by subtracting off the
contribution of the side information Y[S,C] from Ai∗ = cWXW + ∑i∈S ciXi.
Example 3. Consider a scenario where the server has K = 5 messages X1, . . . , X5 ∈ F3, and the user
demands the message X1 and has a coded side information Y = X2 + 2X3 with support size M = 2.
For this example, W = 1, S = {2, 3}, and C = {c2, c3} = {1, 2}.
The parameters of the MPC protocol for this example are as follows: n = ⌈ KM+1⌉ = 2, I1 = {1, 2, 3},
and I2 = {4, 5, 1}.
First, the user constructs a permutation pi of {1, . . . , 5} as follows. The user randomly chooses an index
j∗ from {1, . . . , 5}, say 4, and assigns the index W = 1 to pi( j∗) = pi(4), i.e., pi(4) = 1. Note that, in
this case, i∗ , ⌈ j
∗
M+1⌉ = 2, and Ii∗ = I2 = {4, 5, 1}. The user then randomly assigns the indices in S,
i.e., 2 and 3, to {pi( j) : j ∈ Ii∗ \ { j
∗}} = {pi(5), pi(1)}, say pi(5) = 3 and pi(1) = 2; and randomly
assigns the (not-yet-assigned) indices 4 and 5 to {pi( j) : j ∈ {1, . . . , 5} \ Ii∗} = {pi(2), pi(3)}, say
pi(2) = 4 and pi(3) = 5. Thus, the permutation pi maps {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} to {2, 4, 5, 1, 3}.
Next, the user constructs n = 2 (ordered) sets U1, U2, each of size M + 1 = 3, defined as U1 =
{pi( j) : j ∈ I1} = {2, 4, 5} and U2 = {pi( j) : j ∈ I2} = {1, 3, 2}; and constructs an (ordered) multiset
V, defined as V = {cpi( j) : j ∈ I2} = {c1, c3, c2} where c2 = 1 and c3 = 2 are the coefficients of X2
and X3 in the side information Y, and c1 is a randomly chosen element from F
×
3 = {1, 2}, say c1 = 2.
Thus, V = {2, 2, 1}.
The user constructs Q1 = (U1, V) = ({2, 4, 5}, {2, 2, 1}) and Q2 = (U2, V) = ({1, 3, 2}, {2, 2, 1}),
and sends the query Q = {Q1, Q2} to the server. The server then computes A1 = 2X2 + 2X4 + X5 and
A2 = 2X1 + 2X3 + X2, and sends the answer A = {A1, A2} back to the user. Then, the user subtracts
off the contribution of Y = X2 + 2X3 from Ai∗ = A2 = 2X2 + X2 + 2X3, and recovers X1.
For this example, the rate of the MPC protocol is 1/2. Note that the rate of the Specialized GRS
Code protocol—which achieves (W, S)-privacy and hence W-privacy, for the scenario of this example
is (K − M)−1 = 1/3.
From the perspective of the server, who knows the model and the parameters as well as the protocol,
the messages X1, . . . , X5 are equally likely to be the user’s demand. This is because, given the query,
for each candidate demand, the server finds a unique potential side information. In particular, by the
protocol, there must exist a linear combination Ai in the answer A = {A1, . . . , An} (i.e., {A1, A2} in
this example) which is a function of the demand and the side information, and not a function of any
other message. For example, given that the candidate demand is X1, the server finds X2 + 2X3 as the
only potential side information, noting that only A2 = 2X1 + X2 + 2X3 is a linear combination of X1
and M = 2 other messages (i.e., X2 and X3).
As an another example, consider the message X2. Given that the candidate demand is X2, there exist
two linear combinations A1 and A2, each of which is a function of X2 and M = 2 other messages.
However, by the protocol, among all linear combinations Ai that are functions of the candidate demand
and M other messages, only the linear combination Ai with the smallest index i is a function of the
demand and the side information. Thus, for the candidate demand X2, the server finds 2X4 + X5 as
the only potential side information, noting that among A1 and A2—which are both functions of X2
and M = 2 other messages, the linear combination A1 = 2X2 + 2X4 + X5 has the smallest index.
Similarly, for each of the other candidate demands X3, X4, X5, the server finds a unique potential side
information. Moreover, the side information support index set is uniformly distributed and the demand
index is conditionally distributed uniformly given the side information support index set. Putting these
arguments together, one can see that given the query each message is equally likely to be the user’s
demand. This confirms that the MPC protocol satisfies the W-privacy condition for this example. It is
worth noting that the existence of a unique potential side information for each candidate demand, which
ensures W-privacy, results in the violation of the (W, S)-privacy condition. For instance, in this example,
given the query, for the candidate demand index 1 the only potential side information support index set
is {2, 3}; and no other pair of indices in {2, . . . , 5} can be a potential side information support index
set for the candidate demand index 1.
Lemma 9. The Modified Partition-and-Code (MPC) protocol is a scalar-linear PIR-CSI–I protocol, and
achieves the rate ⌈ KM+1⌉
−1
.
Proof. See Appendix II-A. ✷
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
A. Converse
In this section, we give an information-theoretic proof of converse for the case of general PIR-CSI–II
protocols, which also serves as a converse proof for the special case of scalar-linear PIR-CSI–II protocols.
Lemma 10. For M = 2 and M = K, the (scalar-linear) capacity of the PIR-CSI–II setting is upper
bounded by 1, and for any 3 ≤ M ≤ K − 1, the (scalar-linear) capacity of the PIR-CSI–II setting is
upper bounded by 1/2.
Proof. In the following, all entropies are conditional on the event 1{W∈S} = 1, and for simplifying
the notation, we remove this event from the conditions everywhere.
Take arbitrary W, S, C (and Y , Y[S,C]) such that W ∈ S. For the cases of M = 2 and M = K, it
suffices to show that H(A) ≥ L. Note that H(A) ≥ H(A|Q, Y) = H(A, XW |Q, Y), where the equality
follows from the recoverability condition, and H(A, XW |Q, Y) = H(XW |Q, Y) + H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥
H(XW), where the inequality follows from the independence of XW and (Q, Y) by assumption. Putting
these arguments together, H(A) ≥ H(XW) = L.
For the cases of 3 ≤ M ≤ K − 1, we need to show that H(A) ≥ 2L. By the above arguments, we
have
H(A) ≥ H(XW) + H(A|Q, Y, XW). (23)
Consider an arbitrary index W1 ∈ S. By the result of Lemma 2, there exist S1 ∈ S with W1 ∈ S1 and
C1 ∈ C (and Y1 = Y
[S1,C1]) such that H(XW1 |A, Q, Y1) = 0. Since conditioning does not increase the
entropy, then H(XW1 |A, Q, Y, XW , Y1) = 0. Then, we can write
H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥ H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1)
= H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1)
+ H(XW1 |A, Q, Y, XW , Y1)
= H(A, XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1)
= H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1)
+ H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y1, XW1)
≥ H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1). (24)
Noting that Y, XW , Y1, XW1 are linear functions of the messages in XK, and Q is independent of
XK, there are two possible cases: (i) H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1) = H(XW1), i.e., XW1 is independent of
(Q, Y, XW , Y1), or (ii) H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1) = 0, i.e., XW1 can be recovered from Q, Y, XW , Y1.
In the case (i), H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1) = H(XW1) by assumption. Rewriting (24), we have
H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥ H(XW1). (25)
By (23) and (25), H(A) ≥ H(XW) + H(XW1) = 2L.
In the case (ii), by assumption, H(XW1 |Q, Y, XW , Y1) = 0. Again, by the linearity of Y, XW , Y1, XW1 ,
it must hold that Y = cWXW + cW1 XW1 + Z and Y1 = c
′
WXW + c
′
W1
XW1 + c
′Z for some c′W , c
′
W1
, c′ ∈
F
×
q , where Z = ∑i∈S\{W,W1} ciXi. Unlike the previous case, this time we turn to an arbitrary index
W2 6∈ S. Again, by the result of Lemma 2, there exist S2 ∈ S with W2 ∈ S2 and C2 ∈ C (and
Y2 = Y
[S2,C2]) such that H(XW2 |A, Q, Y2) = 0. Similar to (24), it can be shown that
H(A|Q, Y, XW) ≥ H(XW2 |Q, Y, XW , Y2)
+ H(A|Q, Y, XW , Y2, XW2). (26)
If XW2 is independent of (Q, Y, XW , Y2), similarly as in the case (i) we can show that H(A) ≥
H(XW) + H(XW2) = 2L. If XW2 is recoverable from (Q, Y, XW , Y2), it must hold that Y2 = c
′′
W2
XW2 +
c′′(cW1 XW1 + Z) for some c
′′
W2
, c′′ ∈ F×q . Note that XW2 is independent of (Q, Y1, XW1 , Y2) since by
construction, XW2 cannot be recovered from c
′
WXW + c
′Z and c′′W2 XW2 + c
′′Z, or in turn, from Y1 and
Y2 given XW1 . Also, XW1 is independent of (Q, Y1 , Y2) since, again by construction, XW1 cannot be
recovered from Y1 and Y2. Thus, we can write
H(A) ≥ H(A|Q, Y1 , Y2)
= H(A, XW1 , XW2 |Q, Y1 , Y2) (27)
≥ H(XW1 |Q, Y1 , Y2)
+ H(XW2 |Q, XW1 , Y1, Y2)
= H(XW1) + H(XW2) (28)
where (27) holds because H(XW1 |A, Q, Y1 , Y2) = 0 and H(XW2 |A, Q, Y1 , XW1 , Y2) = 0, noting that
by assumption, H(XW1 |A, Q, Y1) = 0 and H(XW2 |A, Q, Y2) = 0; and (28) holds since as was shown
earlier, XW1 and XW2 are independent of (Q, Y1 , Y2) and (Q, Y1, XW1 , Y2), respectively. By (28), we
get H(A) ≥ 2L. ✷
B. Achievability
In this section, we propose a scalar-linear PIR-CSI–II protocol for each of the following cases: (Case 1)
M = 2; (Case 2) 3 ≤ M ≤ K2 + 1; (Case 3)
K+1
2 ≤ M ≤ K − 1; and (Case 4) M = K. (Note that
Cases 2 and 3 are overlapping at M = K2 + 1 or M =
K+1
2 when K is even or odd, respectively. In
these scenarios, either of the proposed protocols for Cases 2 and 3 applies.) It should be noted that the
proposed protocols for Cases 1 and 2 are applicable for any base-field size q ≥ 2 and any field-extension
degree l ≥ 1; whereas the proposed protocols for Cases 3 and 4 are applicable for any q ≥ 3 and any
l ≥ 1.
The proposed protocols are based on the idea of randomizing the structure of query/answer, and are
referred to as the Randomized Selection-and-Code (RSC) protocols. In particular, in these protocols, for
any given instance of the problem, there exist multiple different query/answer structures, each of which
satisfies the recoverability condition; and one of these structures will be chosen at random according to
a probability distribution, which is carefully designed to ensure the W-privacy condition.
For example, consider a scenario of Case 1 in which the server stores X1, X2, X3, . . . , XK, and the
user’s demand and side information are X1 and X1 + X2, respectively. The RSC protocol for Case 1
has two different (query/answer) structures: (i) the user queries X1, which is the user’s demand, and the
server sends X1 back to the user; or (ii) the user queries X2, which is the other message in the user’s
side information, and the server sends back X2 to the user. (Note that neither of these structures depend
on the other messages X3, . . . , XK.) The RSC protocol for Case 1 randomly generates one of the two
structures (i) and (ii), according to a probability distribution—specified shortly in the description of the
protocol, designed in order to guarantee W-privacy (i.e., given the query, each message in X1, . . . , XK
is equally likely to be the user’s demand.) Note that using either of the two structures (i) and (ii), the
user can recover X1. The RSC protocols for Cases 2-4 use a similar idea.
For the ease of exposition, w.l.o.g., we assume that W = {1}, S = {1, . . . , M}, and C = {c1, . . . , cM}.
Randomized Selection-and-Code (RSC) Protocols: The RSC protocol for each case consists of three
steps, where the steps 2-3 are the same as Steps 2-3 in the MPC protocol (Section VI-B). The step 1 of
the RSC protocols are as follows:
Case 1: The user randomly selects the index W (i.e., 1) with probability 1K , or the other index in S
(i.e., 2) with probability K−1K , and constructs two sets U = {i} and V = {1}, where i is the selected
index by the user.
The user then constructs Q = (U, V), and sends the query Q[W,S,C] = Q to the server.
Example 4. Consider a scenario where the server has K = 6 messages X1, . . . , X6 ∈ F3, and the user
demands the message X1 and has a coded side information Y = 2X1 + X2 with support size M = 2.
For this example, W = 1, S = {1, 2}, and C = {c1, c2} = {2, 1}.
The user randomly selects an index i from S = {1, 2}, where the probability of selecting the index
i = 1 is 1K =
1
6 , and the probability of selecting the index i = 2 is
K−1
K =
5
6 . Suppose that the user
selects the index i = 2. Then, the user requests the server for the message Xi = X2, and the server
responds by sending X2 to the user. Subtracting off X2 from Y = 2X1 + X2, the user then recovers X1.
For this example, the rate of the RSC protocol is 1. Note that the Modified Specialized GRS Code
protocol—which yields (W, S)-privacy and hence W-privacy, achieves the rate (K − M + 1)−1 = 1/5
for the scenario of this example.
From the server’s perspective, the probability that the message X2 is the user’s demand is
1
6 , and the
probability that one of the messages X1, X3, . . . , X6 is the user’s demand is
5
6 . Since these messages are
equally likely to be the demand, the probability of any of them to be the user’s demand is 56 ×
1
5 =
1
6 .
This guarantees the W-privacy.
Now, suppose that the user selects i = 1. In this case, the user requests their demand X1 from the
server, and the server responds by sending X1 back to the user. Again, from the perspective of the server,
the probability that the message X1 is the user’s demand is
1
6 , and the probability of any of the messages
X2, . . . , X6 to be the user’s demand is
5
6 ×
1
5 =
1
6 . This again ensures the W-privacy.
Case 2: The user constructs two (ordered) sets U1, U2, each of size M − 1, with elements from the
indices in K, and an (ordered) multiset V of size M − 1 with elements from F×q . The constructions of
U1, U2, V are as follows.
First, the user chooses an integer r ∈ {M − 2, M − 1} by sampling from a probability distribution
given by
P(r = r) =


2M−2
K , r = M − 2,
1 − 2M−2K , r = M − 1.
If r = M − 1 is chosen, the user randomly selects M − 1 indices from K \ S; otherwise, if r =
M− 2 is chosen, the user selects the index W along with M− 2 randomly chosen indices from K \ S.
Denote by {i1 , . . . , iM−1} the (ordered) set of the M − 1 selected indices (in increasing order). Then,
the user constructs U1 = {2, . . . , M} (i.e., the set of elements in S \W in increasing order) and U2 =
{i1, . . . , iM−1}.
Next, the user constructs the (ordered) multiset V = {c2, . . . , cM} (i.e., the sequence of elements in
C excluding the element cW).
The user then constructs Qi = (Ui, V) for each i ∈ {1, 2}, and for a randomly chosen permutation
σ : {1, 2} 7→ {1, 2}, sends the query Q[W,S,C] = {Qσ(1), Qσ(2)} to the server.
Example 5. Consider a scenario where the server has K = 6 messages X1, . . . , X6 ∈ F3, and the user
demands the message X1 and has a coded side information Y = 2X1 + X2 + 2X3 with support size
M = 3. For this example, W = 1, S = {1, 2, 3}, and C = {c1, c2, c3} = {2, 1, 2}.
First, the user randomly chooses an integer r ∈ {M − 2 = 1, M − 1 = 2}, where the probability of
choosing r = 1 is 23 , and the probability of choosing r = 2 is
1
3 . Suppose that the user chooses r = 1. The
user then selects the index W = 1 along with r = 1 randomly chosen index from {1, . . . , 6} \ {1, 2, 3} =
{4, 5, 6}, say the index 4. Then, the user constructs two (ordered) sets U1 = {2, 3} and U2 = {1, 4},
and the (ordered) multiset V = {c2, c3} = {1, 2}.
Then, the user constructs Q1 = (U1, V) = ({2, 3}, {1, 2}) and Q2 = (U2, V) = ({1, 4}, {1, 2}). For
a randomly chosen permutation σ on {1, 2}, say σ(1) = 2 and σ(2) = 1, the user constructs the query
Q = {Qσ(1), Qσ(2)} = {Q2, Q1}, and sends it to the server. The server computes Ai = ∑
M−1
j=1 ci j Xi j for
each i ∈ {1, 2} where Qi = ({i1 , i2}, {ci1 , ci2}). For this example, A1 = X2 + 2X3 and A2 = X1 + 2X4.
Then, the server sends the answer A = {Aσ(1), Aσ(2)} = {A2, A1} back to the user. Subtracting off
A1 from Y = 2X1 + X2 + 2X3, the user recovers X1.
For this example, the rate of the RSC protocol is 1/2; whereas the rate of the Modified Specialized
GRS Code protocol for the scenario of this example is (K − M + 1)−1 = 1/4.
From the server’s perspective, U1 = {2, 3} and U2 = {1, 4} are equally likely to be the index set of
the user’s side information support set (excluding the demand index). Let us refer to the event that X2
and X3 (or X1 and X4) are the two messages in the user’s side information support set as E1 (or E2).
Then, E1 (or E2) has probability 12 . Note also that, given E1 (or E2), X2 and X3 (or X1 and X4) have
zero probability to be the user’s demand.
Given E1, (i) with probability 13 , the user’s demand is neither X1 nor X4, or (ii) with probability
2
3 , the
user’s demand is either X1 or X4. Given E1-(i), X5 and X6 are equally likely to be the user’s demand.
That is, given E1, X5 (or X6) is the user’s demand with probability
1
3 ×
1
2 =
1
6 . Given E1-(ii), X1 and
X4 are equally likely to be the user’s demand. Then, given E1, X1 (or X4) is the user’s demand with
probability 23 ×
1
2 =
1
3 .
Given E2, (i) with probability 13 , the user’s demand is neither X2 nor X3, or (ii) with probability
2
3 , the
user’s demand is either X2 or X3. Given E2-(i), either of X5 and X6 is the user’s demand with probability
1
2 . Then, given E2, X5 (or X6) is the user’s demand with probability
1
3 ×
1
2 =
1
6 . Given E2-(ii), either
of X2 and X3 is the user’s demand with probability
1
2 . Then, given E1, X2 (or X3) is the user’s demand
with probability 23 ×
1
2 =
1
3 .
From the above arguments, it is easy to see that given the query, each message Xi is equally likely to
be the user’s demand, and hence the W-privacy condition is satisfied. For example, X1 has probability
1
3
(or 0) to be the user’s demand given E1 (or E2). Since E1 and E2 each have probability 12 , the probability
of X1 to be the user’s demand is
1
2 ×
1
3 +
1
2 × 0 =
1
6 . As an another example, consider X5. Given either
of E1 or E2, X5 has probability
1
6 to be the user’s demand. Thus, the probability of X5 to be the user’s
demand is 12 ×
1
6 +
1
2 ×
1
6 =
1
6 .
Case 3: The user constructs two (ordered) sets U1, U2, each of size M, with elements from the indices
in K, and an (ordered) multiset V of size M with elements from F×q . The constructions of U1, U2, V
are as follows.
The user chooses an integer s ∈ {2M − K − 1, 2M− K} by sampling from a probability distribution
given by
P(s = s) =


1− 2K−2MK , s = 2M − K − 1,
2K−2M
K , s = 2M − K.
If s = 2M − K is chosen, the user randomly selects 2M − K indices from S \ W; otherwise, if s =
2M−K− 1 is chosen, the user selects the index W together with 2M−K− 1 randomly chosen indices
from S \W. Denote by {i1, . . . , iM} the (ordered) set of the 2M − K selected indices and the K − M
indices in K\ S (in increasing order). Then, the user constructs U1 = {1, . . . , M} (i.e., the set of elements
in S in increasing order) and U2 = {i1, . . . , iM}.
Next, the user constructs the (ordered) multiset V = {c, c2, . . . , cM} (i.e., the sequence of the elements
in C, except when the element cW is replaced by the element c) where c is randomly chosen from
F
×
q \ {c1} (i.e., F
×
q \ {cW}).
The user then constructs Qi = (Ui, V) for each i ∈ {1, 2}, and for a randomly chosen permutation
σ : {1, 2} 7→ {1, 2}, sends the query Q[W,S,C] = {Qσ(1), Qσ(2)} to the server.
Case 4: The user creates two (ordered) sets U = {1, . . . , K} and V = {c, c2 , . . . , cK} (i.e., the sequence
of elements in C, except when the element cW is replaced by the element c) where c is randomly chosen
from F×q \ {c1} (i.e., F
×
q \ {cW}).
The user then constructs Q = (U, V), and sends the query Q[W,S,C] = Q to the server.
Lemma 11. The Randomized Selection-and-Code (RSC) protocols for M = 2, 3 ≤ M ≤ K2 + 1,
K+1
2 ≤ M ≤ K − 1, and M = K are scalar-linear PIR-CSI–II protocols, and achieve the rates 1, 1/2,
1/2, and 1, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix II-B. ✷
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we studied the fundamental limits of single-message single-server information-theoretic
PIR in the presence of a coded side information. Considering two different types of privacy, namely
(W, S)-privacy and W-privacy, we characterized the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity of the problem
under two different models depending on whether the support set of the user’s coded side information
includes the requested message or not. In addition, for each problem setting we proposed a novel scalar-
linear scheme that achieves the capacity.
One natural question that remains open is that how much the capacity will increase if we relax the
assumption that the server knows the considered model, i.e., whether the side information is a function of
the demand or not. Our preliminary results, beyond the scope of this work and hence not presented here,
suggest that in an asymptotic regime (when the number of messages in the database grows unbounded),
the capacity remains the same even if the server is aware of whether the side information depends on
the demand or not. A detailed study of this observation remains open.
Another direction for future work is to characterize the capacity of the single-server PIR when the user
has multiple coded side information and/or wants multiple messages from the server. Our initial attempts
at studying these settings suggest that there is a close relation between these problems and the problem
of single-server private computation with coded side information, which is the focus of an ongoing work.
Last but not least, the extensions of this work for multi-server setting were also recently studied
in [32] and [33] for the cases in which W-privacy and (W, S)-privacy are required, respectively. Some
achievability schemes based on those in this work were proposed; notwithstanding, the capacity of these
settings are still open in general.
APPENDIX I
PROOFS OF LEMMAS 4 AND 7
A. Proof of Lemma 4
Since the matrix G, defined in Step 1 of the Specialized GRS Code protocol, generates a (K, K − M)
GRS code which is an MDS code, the rows of G are linearly independent. Accordingly, A1, . . . , AK−M,
defined in Step 2, are linearly independent combinations of the messages in XK, which are themselves
independently and uniformly distributed over Fql . This implies that A1, . . . , AK−M are independently
and uniformly distributed over Fql . Since H(X j) = L for all j ∈ K, then H(Ai) = L for all i ∈
{1, . . . , K − M}. Thus, for all W ∈ K, S ∈ S , C ∈ C such that W 6∈ S, we have H(A[W,S,C]) =
H(A1, . . . , AK−M) = ∑
K−M
i=1 H(Ai) = (K − M)L. (Note that H(A
[W,S,C]) = (K − M)L does not
depend on the realizations W, S, C.) Given that W 6∈ S, W and S are jointly distributed uniformly, and C
is distributed uniformly (and independently from (W, S)). Thus, H(A[W,S,C]|W 6∈ S) = H(A[W,S,C]) =
(K − M)L, implying that the rate of the Specialized GRS Code protocol is equal to L/((K − M)L) =
(K − M)−1.
The scalar-linearity of Ai’s in the messages X j’s confirms that the Specialized GRS Code protocol is
scalar-linear. From the construction, it should also be obvious that the recoverability condition is satisfied.
The proof of (W, S)-privacy relies on two facts: (i) the (K, K − M) GRS code, generated by the matrix
G, is an MDS code, and hence the minimum (Hamming) weight of a codeword is K − (K − M) + 1 =
M + 1; and (ii) there exist the same number of minimum-weight codewords for any support of size
M + 1 [37]. The rest of the proof is as follows.
From (i) and (ii), for any W∗ ∈ K, S∗ ∈ S such that W∗ 6∈ S∗, the dual code, whose parity check
matrix is G, contains the same number of parity check equations with support W∗ ∪ S∗ (i.e., the messages
{Xi}i∈W∗∪S∗ have non-zero coefficients and the rest of the messages all have zero coefficients). For given
W∗, S∗, consider an arbitrary such parity check equation Z = cW∗XW∗ +∑i∈S∗ ciXi where ci ∈ F
×
q for all
i ∈ W∗∪ S∗. The candidate demand XW∗ can be recovered from Z, only given a potential side information
∑i∈S∗ c(ciXi) for arbitrary c ∈ F
×
q . Noting that |F
×
q | = q− 1, for any given parity check equation Z with
support W∗ ∪ S∗, there exist only q− 1 potential side information, namely {c(Z−∑i∈S∗ ciXi) : c ∈ F
×
q },
from each of which the candidate demand XW∗ can be recovered. This proves the (W, S)-privacy of the
Specialized GRS Code protocol.
B. Proof of Lemma 7
The proof, omitted to avoid repetition, follows from the same lines as in the proof of Lemma 4
(Appendix I-A).
APPENDIX II
PROOFS OF LEMMAS 9 AND 11
A. Proof of Lemma 9
By the construction of the Modified Partition-and-Code (MPC) protocol (see Steps 1-2), A1, . . . , An
are linearly independent combinations of the messages in XK. Using a similar argument as the one in the
proof of Lemma 4 (Appendix I-A), it can be shown that H(A[W,S,C]) = H(A1, . . . , An) = nL for all
W ∈ K, S ∈ S , C ∈ C such that W 6∈ S, and H(A[W,S,C]|W 6∈ S) = H(A[W,S,C]) = nL. This implies
that the rate of the MPC protocol is equal to L/nL = ⌈ KM+1⌉
−1.
The scalar-linearity of the MPC protocol should be obvious from the construction. The recoverability
condition is also obviously satisfied (see Step 3).
To prove that the MPC protocol satisfies the W-privacy condition, we need to show that for any query
Q generated by the protocol,
P(W = W|Q = Q, W 6∈ S) = P(W = W|W 6∈ S)
for all W ∈ K, or in turn, P(W = W|Q = Q, W 6∈ S) does not depend on W. (Note that by construction,
Q is independent of the messages in XK.)
By Step 1 of the protocol, for any given W ∈ K, there exist a unique SW ∈ S (with W 6∈ SW) and
a unique CW ∈ C such that the triple (W, SW , CW) complies with the query Q, i.e., given that XW and
Y[SW ,CW ] are the user’s demand and side information, respectively, the protocol could potentially generate
the query Q. Then, we have
P(W = W|Q = Q, W 6∈ S)
= P(W = W, S = SW , C = CW|Q = Q, W 6∈ S).
Since the conditional distribution of (W, S, C) given W 6∈ S is uniform, by applying the Bayes’ rule
one can see that P(W = W, S = SW , C = CW|Q = Q, W 6∈ S) does not depend on W so long as
P(Q = Q|W = W, S = SW , C = CW) does not depend on W. By the design of the protocol,
P(Q = Q|W = W, S = SW , C = CW)
=
1
K!
(
K − 1
M
)
(q − 1)−1
for all W ∈ K, and hence P(W = W|Q = Q, W 6∈ S) does not depend on W.
B. Proof of Lemma 11
The proofs for the rates of the RSC protocols follow the same line as in the proof of the rate of the
MPC protocol in Lemma 9 (Appendix II-A), and hence omitted. From the construction, it should also
be obvious that the RSC protocols are scalar-linear. Moreover, it should not be hard to see from the
description of these protocols that the recoverability condition is satisfied.
To prove that the RSC protocols satisfy the W-privacy condition, we need to show that
P(W = W|Q = Q, W ∈ S) = P(W = W|W ∈ S)
for all W ∈ K. Alternatively, by the Bayes’ rule, it suffices to show that P(Q = Q|W = W, W ∈ S)
does not depend on W.
Recall that Q = (U, V) for Cases 1 and 4, and Q = {Q1, Q2} = {(U1, V), (U2 , V)} for Cases 2
and 3. For simplifying the notation, let us denote {U1, U2} by U for Cases 2 and 3. By the construction
of the RSC protocols and the model assumptions, given W ∈ S, the following two observations hold:
(i) U and V are conditionally independent given W, and (ii) V and W are independent. The observation
(i) should be obvious, and the observation (ii) holds because V is uniformly distributed over all possible
choices of V for each case. (For example, for Case 1, V = {1}; and for Case 2, V = {ci : i ∈ S \W}—
where ci’s are uniformly distributed over F
×
q , is uniformly distributed over all ordered multisets of size
M − 1 with elements from F×q .) Using (i) and (ii),
P(Q = Q|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(U = U, V = V|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(V = V|W ∈ S)× P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S).
Since P(V = V|W ∈ S) does not depend on W, instead of showing that P(Q = Q|W = W, W ∈ S)
is not a function of W, it suffices to show that P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S) does not depend on W. In
the following, we prove this claim for the RSC protocol for each case separately.
With a slight abuse of notation, hereafter for the ease of exposition, we treat the ordered sets U1, U2
as (unordered) sets.
Case 1: For an arbitrary i ∈ K, consider U = {i}. Take an arbitrary W ∈ K. There are two cases as
follows: (i) W = i, and (ii) W 6= i.
In the case (i), we have
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S)
= ∑
j∈K\W
P(U = U|W = W, S = {W, j})
× P(S = {W, j}|W = W, W ∈ S). (29)
By the model assumption, we have
P(S = {W, j}|W = W, W ∈ S) =
1
K − 1
(30)
for all j ∈ K \W. Moreover, given that W = W and S = {W, j}, the protocol constructs U = {W}
with probability 1K . This implies that
P(U = U|W = W, S = {W, j}) =
1
K
(31)
for all j ∈ K \W. Substituting (30) and (31) into (29),
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S) =
1
K
. (32)
In the case (ii), we have
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(U = U|W = W, S = {W, i})
× P(S = {W, i}|W = W, W ∈ S)
=
1
K
, (33)
noting that by the model assumption,
P(S = {W, i}|W = W, W ∈ S) =
1
K − 1
,
and by the design of the protocol,
P(U = U|W = W, S = {W, i}) =
K − 1
K
.
From (32) and (33), we can conclude that P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S) does not depend on W.
Case 2: Consider an arbitrary U = {U1, U2}. (Recall that |U1| = |U2| = M− 1.) Take an arbitrary
W ∈ K. There are two cases as follows: (i) W ∈ U1 ∪U2, and (ii) W 6∈ U1 ∪U2.
In the case (i), w.l.o.g., assume that W ∈ U1. Note that W = W and W ∈ U1 together imply that
S = W ∪U2 (by the design of the protocol). Then, we have
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(U = U|W = W, S = W ∪U2)
× P(S = W ∪U2|W = W, W ∈ S). (34)
By the model assumption, we have
P(S = W ∪U2|W = W, W ∈ S) =
(
K − 1
M − 1
)−1
. (35)
Moreover, given that W = W and S = W ∪U2, the protocol constructs U1 with probability (
2M−2
K )×
(K−MM−2)
−1
, noting that W ∈ U1. (The protocol selects the demand index W to be one of the elements in
U1 with probability
2M−2
K , and selects the set of other M − 2 elements in U1 from the set of K − M
indices in K \ S with probability (K−MM−2)
−1
.) This implies that
P(U = U|W = W, S = W ∪U2)
= 2
(
M − 1
K
)(
K − M
M − 2
)−1
. (36)
Substituting (35) and (36) into (34),
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S)
= 2
(
M− 1
K
)(
K − M
M − 2
)−1(K − 1
M − 1
)−1
. (37)
In the case (ii), we have
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(U = U|W = W, S = W ∪U1)
× P(S = W ∪U1|W = W, W ∈ S)
+ P(U = U|W = W, S = W ∪U2)
× P(S = W ∪U2|W = W, W ∈ S)
= 2
(
1 −
2M − 2
K
)(
K − M
M − 1
)−1(K − 1
M − 1
)−1
, (38)
noting that
P(U = U|W = W, S = W ∪U1)
= P(U = U|W = W, S = W ∪U2)
=
(
1−
2M − 2
K
)(
K − M
M− 1
)−1
,
and
P(S = W ∪U1|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(S = W ∪U2|W = W, W ∈ S)
=
(
K − 1
M − 1
)−1
.
Now, it is easy to verify that (
M− 1
K
)(
K − M
M − 2
)−1
=
(
1 −
2M− 2
K
)(
K − M
M − 1
)−1
.
This shows that (37) and (38) are equal, completing the proof that P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S) does not
depend on W.
Case 3: Consider an arbitrary query U = {U1, U2}. (Recall that |U1| = |U2| = M.) Take an arbitrary
W ∈ K. There are two cases as follows: (i) W ∈ U1 ∩U2, and (ii) W 6∈ U1 ∩U2.
In the case (i), we have
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(U = U|W = W, S = U1)
× P(S = U1|W = W, W ∈ S)
+ P(U = U|W = W, S = U2)
× P(S = U2|W = W, W ∈ S)
= 2
(
2M− K
K
)(
M − 1
2M− K − 1
)−1(K − 1
M − 1
)−1
, (39)
noting that
P(U = U|W = W, S = U1)
= P(U = U|W = W, S = U2)
=
(
2M − K
K
)(
M − 1
2M − K − 1
)−1
,
and
P(S = U1|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(S = U2|W = W, W ∈ S)
=
(
K − 1
M − 1
)−1
.
In the case (ii), w.l.o.g., assume that W ∈ U1. Then, we have
P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S)
= P(U = U|W = W, S = U1)
× P(S = U1|W = W, W ∈ S)
= 2
(
K − M
K
)(
M − 1
2M− K
)−1(K − 1
M− 1
)−1
, (40)
noting that
P(U = U|W = W, S = U1)
= 2
(
K − M
K
)(
M− 1
2M − K
)−1
,
and
P(S = U1|W = W, W ∈ S) =
(
K − 1
M − 1
)−1
.
It is easy to verify that (
2M− K
K
)(
M− 1
2M− K − 1
)−1
=
(
K − M
K
)(
M− 1
2M − K
)−1
.
This shows that (39) and (40) are equal, completing the proof that P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S) does not
depend on W.
Case 4: By the protocol, we have U = K, and hence P(U = U|W = W, W ∈ S) = 1 for all W.
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